

The Congress said: We are not going to build earth-penetrating, bunker-buster nuclear weapons. There is no end to the menu of nuclear weapons some people want. We are not going to do that. That morphed into Reliable Replacement Warhead, RRW, that was to begin replacing our existing stock of warheads in a big program with the Navy, Air Force, and so on. We stopped that as well. We did not stop it because we did not have the money or anything like that. We stopped it because it is not necessary.

We have a process by which we certify that the current nuclear stockpile works, that it is effective. We have a process by which we do that. We have a lot of interest by other groups that have weighed in on the science of this, saying our existing stock of nuclear weapons will last much longer than some had suggested without spending hundreds of billions of dollars for replacement. Yet some will never be satisfied.

Here are statements by some Senators who also will want to use the ratification of this START treaty as leverage. One Senator said:

Well, I can tell you this, that I think the Senate will find it very hard to support this treaty if there is not a robust modernization plan.

That is the need to design and build new nuclear weapons.

Another one said:

The success of your administration in ensuring the modernization plan is fully funded in the authorization and appropriations process could have a significant impact on the Senate as it considers the START follow-on treaty.

And another one:

My vote on the START treaty will thus depend in large measure on whether I am convinced the administration has put forward an appropriate and adequately funded plan to sustain and modernize the smaller nuclear stockpile it envisions.

As chairman of the Appropriations Energy and Water Development Subcommittee, I can tell my colleagues that the proposed budget for nuclear weapons, which is in my subcommittee, for fiscal year 2011 from this administration is more than enough to maintain the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons; sufficient so that any Chairman of the Joint Chiefs can say with confidence and authority whose requirement it is to certify each year, that we have a nuclear arsenal that can be maintained as reliable and safe for the long-term future.

The National Nuclear Security Agency, the agency that oversees nuclear weapons, would see a 13-percent or \$1.3 billion increase under this President's proposal. There are some who have argued this budget increase and planned future increases may not be sufficient to maintain the current stockpile. But that is just not the case. If we look at the budget request, the administration's budget request includes \$7 billion for nuclear weapons activities. That is an increase of \$624 million in this com-

ing year. It invests significant money in what is called life extension programs. The nuclear weapons in our arsenal are not just the old nuclear weapons. We spend money all the time on life extension programs to make sure they are reliable.

I can go on and talk about the budget. The fact is, this President has sent us a budget that does what he thinks is necessary for the life extension programs and the additional funding. At a time when we have significant financial problems, he is proposing additional funding in this area.

This is a quote from Linton Brooks, who was the NNSA Administrator from 2003 to 2007 under George W. Bush, in February of this year:

START, as I now understand it, is a good idea on its own merits, but I think for those who think it's only a good idea if you only have a strong weapons program, I think this budget ought to take care of that.

Coupled with the out-year projections, it takes care of the concerns about the complex and it does very good things about the stockpile and it should keep the labs healthy. . . .

That is what he said. That is important to understand when my colleagues come to the floor of the Senate and say: I don't know that I can support arms reductions because we want to make sure we have more money spent on nuclear weapons to build a whole class of new nuclear weapons.

Understand, there is nothing partisan here. The person who last headed this agency under George W. Bush said this budget takes care of that. It will give us the confidence we need.

The September 2009 "Report on the Lifetime Extension Program" by the JASON Program Office, which is a very respected group of scientists, said this:

JASON finds no evidence that accumulation of changes incurred from aging and life extension programs have increased risk to certification of today's deployed nuclear warheads.

Simple.

Lifetimes of today's nuclear warheads could be extended for decades, with no anticipated loss in confidence, by using approaches similar to those employed in the life extension programs to date.

We have people around here who are just unbelievably anxious to get moving to begin building an entire new class of nuclear weapons. Yet we have evidence from the science of nuclear weapons that the existing stock of nuclear weapons can be maintained with life extension programs for decades. Why would we do that?

I wish to make a concluding point. I wanted to talk about the START program because it is so important to the future of our relationship with Russia. But much more important than that, it is important for the world.

I pulled out of my desk a wing strut from a backfire bomber and ground-up copper from a Russian submarine. I have taken a hinge from a missile silo in the Ukraine that had an SS-18 with a nuclear warhead aimed at the United States. I have all those in my desk just to remind me every day there is a way

to reduce the number of nuclear weapons: reduce the delivery vehicles without having air-to-air combat, without firing intercontinental ballistic missiles, and without detonating nuclear warheads. It is the kind of program we have engaged in, the Nunn-Lugar program, the Global Threat Reduction Program, and it is also treaties such as the START treaty.

If it is not our responsibility and if it does not fall on our shoulders to provide the world leadership to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, who else is going to do that? Who else? If you read the book by Graham Allison or understand the consequences of both 9/11 and also October 11 of the same year and the report by a CIA agent code named Dragonfire, that a terrorist group had stolen a 10-kiloton weapon and would detonate it in an American city, if that doesn't send chills down your spine for the future of this world, then there is something fundamentally wrong with your system.

We have to understand if we do not back away from this difficult specter of a new world in which terrorists are trying very hard to acquire nuclear weapons—they don't have to acquire very much. They have to acquire the equivalent of perhaps a 2-liter bottle of highly enriched uranium. Think of one of those 2-liter Coke bottles at the gas station that sits on the counter the next time you go past, 2 liters of soft drink. Think of 2 liters of highly enriched nuclear material to produce one nuclear weapon.

Some of my colleagues, at least some folks kind of made light of, and some commentators on the radio made fun of the very large group of foreign leaders that was called to this town a week ago to deal with this question of how we get our arms around and begin securing loose nuclear materials that exist around the world. That was nothing to laugh at. That was a historic opportunity by this administration, a big deal by this President to say: You know what. That leadership is our responsibility, and we are going to call leaders from all around the world to talk about these loose nuclear materials that can be acquired by a terrorist organization and made into a bomb, and we are going to secure these materials. We are spending money to do that. We are spending money in our budget to do that. But this President said: Let's work much harder. Let's rededicate ourselves, and not just us, let's all of us rededicate ourselves to gather and secure the loose nuclear material and prevent access to that material by a terrorist organization.

Again, this responsibility falls to us. It is our responsibility to lead, to help stop the spread of nuclear weapons. It is also our responsibility, hopefully, to lead toward where the nonproliferation treaty insists we go; that is, to fewer and fewer and fewer nuclear weapons on this planet.

I understand we will not and should not disarm unilaterally. I fully understand that. But I also understand that